

Series II
Subjects Files,
1916-1973

Box 12, Folder 8

January 1957 -
August 1957

0108

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, R. I.

January 29, 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR FILES

Subj: Notes on the Planning Cycle

1. On the national level, use of the term "planning" is one which may have been obscured as to just what it is supposed to accomplish. Planning as carried out in Washington includes at least all of the following:

(a) A national Estimate of the Situation. There is no single document which neatly ties together in one sheaf of papers a formalized national estimate of the situation, but the elements of such an estimate exist in recognizable form.

(b) Numerous documents before the National Security Council outline the national objectives of the U.S. In simplest form these documents set forth the basic elements of what the nation stands for, and what world situation this nation would like to see come about. These represent "the appropriate effect desired," or "the objective."

(c) Supporting documents include a summary of the existing situation together with all available evaluated intelligence.

(d) Also there will be found in the National Security Council numerous studies which survey the means that are available to the U.S. to achieve its objectives, and those which may be opposed. Studies of these matters are general in nature, and cover the political, economic, psychological and military factors pertaining directly to the U.S. and to its possible enemies, and those pertaining to other nations.

(e) These studies of "means available and opposed" are supported by studies as to "suitability, feasibility and acceptability." They include analyses of various courses of action open to the U.S. to achieve its basic national objectives.

2. Supplementary studies analyze the national objectives, in terms of what effects are desired with regard to specific or detailed objectives. Possible courses of action to support these detailed objectives are examined, together with their suitability, feasibility and acceptability.

0109

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : President, Naval War College

DATE: 7 March 1957

FROM : Head, WW II Battle Evaluation Group

SUBJECT: Global Strategy Discussions

1. Mr. Howard Cushing got ahold of me yesterday and recommended that Mr. Edwin Russell, of Harrisburg, Pa., who edits the Harrisburg Patriot and the Harrisburg Evening News, be invited to Global Strategy. He said that Mr. Russell was very anxious to come, was a famed lecturer and student of world affairs, and would be a great addition to GSD. (If it means anything, he is married to the daughter of the Duke of Marlborough.)
2. I should like to suggest that it might be a wise thing to invite Admiral Theobald to GSD. He is a man who has kept very alert to the times, writes a column for a local newspaper up there, and has become quite prominent recently because of the two books he has written or edited--"The Truth About Pearl Harbor" and "Death of a Navy".
3. Mr. Cushing also told me that Mr. William Randolph Hearst, Jr. says that he would like to come to GSD and will come.

R. W. BATES

0110

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, R. I.

15 March 1957

MEMORANDUM

From: Secretary

To: Head, World War II Evaluation Group

Subj: Special Clerk-Stenographer; hiring of

Ref: (a) BuPers ltr Pers-Clc-gsq (Mr. Kenyon) dtd 6 Mar 57 to Como Bates
(b) Sec ltr to PresNavWarCol dtd 7 Mar 57
(c) Sec ltr to PresNavWarCol dtd 12 Mar 57

1. Reference (a) was referred to me for information and return to the addressee with such action as deemed appropriate. By references (b) and (c), I requested authority to hire a clerk-stenographer to fill a billet left vacant by the anticipated reduction of one consultant. In reply to references (b) and (c), the President approved the recommendation of the Head, Academic Plans Group to hire a Politico-Economic Geographer to fill the consultant's billet.

2. As the official correspondence is now in the mail, attempting to procure a Politico-Economic Geographer by 1 July 1957, it is obvious that the consultant's billet cannot be used to hire a clerk-stenographer. And as that is the only vacant billet at the War College and very little hope of obtaining an additional billet, the only course of action left appears to be an attempt to hire contractual stenographic help. If you desire me to attempt this latter solution, please let me know. This type of work would appear to be unsatisfactory, as it would of necessity have to be a piece-work contract. Offering so much for each smooth page, and would thereby not permit the flexibility enjoyed by having the typist under hire. Under the contract system, if a mistake is found early in the book, the subsequent re-typing job could not be paid for, and considerable discontent is anticipated.

4. Reference (a) is returned herewith.

Very respectfully,


R. L. RAMEY

0111

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND

10 April 1957

From: Commander Roy S. BELCHER, Jr, U.S. Navy
To: Head, World War II Battle Evaluation Group

Subj: Regular Trip Report

Ref: (a) Naval War College Instruction 1321.1A

1. This trip report is submitted in compliance with reference (a). Commander Howard Cole, U.S. Navy and Commander Roy S. Belcher, Jr, U.S. Navy, of the World War II Battle Evaluation Group were in Washington, D.C., 3 April 1957 on temporary additional duty for the primary purpose of researching certain historical records in connection with the Battle for Leyte Gulf.

2. Persons contacted in the course of this research were:

a. Mr. Paul A. Bishop, Director, U.S. Naval Records Management Center, Alexandria, Virginia.

b. Mr. Carl J. MacDonald, Assistant Director, U.S. Naval Records Management Center, Alexandria, Virginia.

c. Mrs. Mildred Mayeaux, Classified Operational Archives, WW II (Op 292).

d. Mrs. Lily Y. Tanaka, Classified Operational Archives, WW II (Op 292).

3. (a) Mr. Bishop and Mr. MacDonald were most helpful in locating the desired squadron master flight logs and offered helpful suggestions in determining where additional desired information on the aircraft searches in question could be found.

(b) Mrs. Mayeaux assisted in a search of the Classified Operational Archives for War Diaries, Aircraft Action Reports and Squadron Histories which would provide additional information on these aircraft searches.

(c) Various aspects of Japanese information available to the World War II Battle Evaluation Group was discussed with Mrs. Tanaka who acts as translator for this group.

4. Itinerary:

Departed:	NAS Quonset Pt., R.I.	0900, 3 April 1957
Arrived :	Washington, D.C.	1121, 3 April 1957
Departed:	Washington, D.C.	1745, 3 April 1957
Arrived :	NAS Quonset Pt., R.I.	2120, 3 April 1957


E. S. BELCHER, JR

0112

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Commodore Bates

DATE: 18 April 1957

FROM : Captain Gimber

SUBJECT: My prospective disposition

1. Since you have recently mentioned going to Washington on personnel matters in the near future, this memorandum is submitted for the purpose of acquainting you with the possible developments in my case and my wishes in the matter.

2. As the result of the physical re-evaluation, which I am about to undergo, there are three possible outcomes; viz.,

a. Physically qualified for all duties in my grade,

b. Physically disqualified for duty,

c. Physically qualified only for duties ashore and recommended for limited duty for some definite period, subject to re-evaluation at the expiration thereof.

3. My views under each of the foregoing are as follows:

a. I would hope to get a billet at Pearl Harbor, subject of course to the time element permitting selection of a suitable relief and his indoctrination.

b. I would hope that you'd be able to prevail on BuMed and BuPers to keep me on active duty for at least a year in view of the prospective legislation currently under consideration.

c. I would hope that you'd be able to keep me here for the probationary period specified in the hospital's recommendation.

Very Respectfully,


H.M.S. GIMBER

0113

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Commodore Bates

DATE: 26 April 1957

FROM : Trembath QMC

SUBJECT: Transfer, Information concerning,

The HISSEN for which I have orders is one of the newer DER's and has the modern conveniences of the modern day Navy. Although the job is routine for a QMC, I feel that it is a satisfactory billet.

As you already know I will be glad to remain with you for a month or as long as I can be of assistance, but a one months extension has several disadvantages. Some of these are (1) the social activities during June such as Global Strategy and Graduation, (2) for the mostpart my work in gathering material for Volume III is completed and I have a good start on material for the next volume, (3) DEERING will be familiar with the work by the end of May, and he will not be available for additional instructions during June as he is requesting leave, and (6) In spite of the bureau's determination to send me to sea you have already, during the past several months, made much more than a reasonable effort to retain me, which I appreciate very much.

In addition to the above is a personal reason. Since receipt of original orders to transfer me in February my wife and I have planned a vacation in Florida for her health. Under present orders, conditions are still favorable for this vacation, however in another month the weather will be undesirable for a such a trip.

Very Respectfully


Samuel Trembath

0114

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

MADN-K

TO : Colonel Morton, Librarian

DATE: 29 April 1957

FROM : Dept. of M.A.&E.

SUBJECT: Reply to Admiral Bates Re Napoleon and Luck

1. Although the quotation in question has a very familiar ring, we have been unable to pin-point it in the more authoritative works in English on Napoleon. Apparently the gist or thought expressed in the quotation is the true basis for the familiar ring; and the exact words may well have been coined by an author and attributed to Napoleon.

2. The analysis of Augereau and Sauret (as "lucky in his operations" and "little lucky" respectively) appears in Napoleon's 14 August 1796 letter to the Directory ("Great Captains: Napoleon", by Dodge, Vol I, page 289). Likewise, Napoleon refers frequently to luck, chance, and fortune in his observations and comments on both campaigns and commanders. Possibly the most famous expressions of his attitude toward the fortune or luck of war follow:

"The fate of a battle is a question of a single moment, a single thought the decisive moment arrives, the moral spark is kindled, and the smallest reserve force settles the matter." ("Journal", Las Casas, Vol I, Pt ii, page 6.)


"The great actions of a great general are not the results of chance or destiny; they come from planning and from genius." (Maxim 82.)

"A cavalry general must have practical knowledge, know the value of seconds, disdain life, and not trust to luck." (Maxim 86.)

"War is composed of nothing but accidents; and, while he should adhere to general principles, a commander should lose no opportunity to profit by these accidents. It is the essence of genius. In war there is only one favorable moment; genius seizes it." (Maxim 95.)

3. In view of Adm. Bates' desire for early reply, the above may be adequate to meet his demands.

1 inc. - Adm Bates' ltr


VINCENT J. ESPOSITO
Colonel, USA
Professor & Head of Department

0115

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND

1 May 1957

From: Commander Roy S. Belcher Jr., U.S. Navy
To: Head, World War II Battle Evaluation Group

Subj: Regular Trip Report

Ref: (a) Naval War College Instruction 1321.1B

1. This trip report is submitted in compliance with reference (a). Commander Howard Cole, USN and Commander Roy S. Belcher Jr, USN of the World War II Battle Evaluation Group visited the Naval Records Management Center, U.S. Naval Supply Depot, Mechanicsburg, Pa., on April 26, 1957.

2. Miss M.E. Lynch, Director, was contacted in an effort to locate additional information concerning air searches conducted during the Battle for Leyte Gulf. Miss Lynch was prepared for the visit and had certain documents available for inspection. These proved to be either of no value to the study or were already held by the Naval War College.

3. Miss Lynch suggested that the squadron logs are likely held in the Naval Records Management Center, U.S. Naval Base, New Orleans, La., and agreed to forward the request of this office concerning certain squadron logs to New Orleans.

4. Miss Lynch was very helpful and suggested we leave with her a list of documents still desired by this office for which she would search. Consequently the following were listed as being desired:

- a. Fleet Air Wing TWO records.
- b. Fleet Air Wing ONE or CTG 30.5 Action Report October 15th to 30th, 1944.
- c. COMCARDIV 22 (CTG 77.4) dispatch file.
- d. COMCARDIV's 25 and 26 (CTU 77.4.31 and CTU 77.4.32), dispatch files.
- e. CTU 30.5.3. (Land-plane Search Group, Tinian) Action Report or War Diary.

5. Itinerary:

Departed:	NAS Quonset Point	0930 26 Apr 1957
Arrived :	Harrisburg State Airport	1230 26 Apr 1957
Departed:	Harrisburg State Airport	1730 26 Apr 1957
Arrived :	NAS Quonset Point	2130 26 Apr 1957.


R. S. BELCHER JR

0116

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Commodore BATES


DATE: 13 May, 1957

FROM : Captain TITUS

SUBJECT: Trip Report; 10 May, 1957.

1. On 10 May, 1957, I went to Washington with Commanders COLE and BELCHER.
2. After finishing the television interview about 1500 I went to see Dr. BAUMGARTEN. I found him at loose ends since his office is being remodeled to provide more room. He was very pleasant and although he did not promise anything I think that he will give us some comment on the dispositions used by the Japanese at Surigao Strait. I left sketches of the 3rd Section, FIRST Striking Force, and of the SECOND Striking Force dispositions and also the copies of the previous correspondence on the subject including the comments of Dr. LAMB.
3. I have been thinking about this and think that I can work up something on it based on hindsight.

Very respectfully,


J. C. TITUS

0117

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief of Staff

DATE: 11 JUNE 1957

FROM : Head, World War II Battle Evaluation Section

SUBJECT: Comments on GSD Critique

1. In accordance with my policy of last year I desire to submit a few comments relating thereto.

(a) Preliminary Information: I heard very little concerning this, so I think that the change this year of giving them fewer references to study was effective.

(b) Entertainment Schedule: As last year the administrative schedule was very well handled and I heard no "kicks". Personally I do think that now that we seemed to have dropped the "Town" cocktail party on Tuesday it may be well to move up the two parties, i.e., the party to the President and the War College dance one day. This would give everyone more opportunity to have clear minds for the Plenary Session. Of course if this idea is not approved I should like to suggest that the party to the President be given on Tuesday leaving Wednesday open.

(c) Administrative Matters: Administrative matters, so far as I could find out, were well handled and I heard no "kicks".

(d) Senior Reserve Officers' Course: The senior reserve officers felt that they had had a very effective discussion this year. I think that they enjoyed the discussion groups more this year than last year, because this time I did not hear that they got more out of the first week than out of the second. My own view about this senior reserve officers' class is the fact that they didn't seem in my mind as devoted toward the objective as they had been in earlier classes. No doubt this was brought on in part by the Navy League to be discussed later, and also by the fact that the repeaters had a tendency to be lax in their attendance and this had an effect on the others.

As regards the films, I am more than ever convinced that the films should be made a must even though the officer has seen them before. There are many battle lessons in them, and those who see them more than once have told me that they learned something each time shown.

One reserve officer (Commander John Adams) said that he thought that the films should be shown in the daytime so that he could attend them, but that he could not attend anything at night. This was the opinion of several others as well as the officer noted.

0118

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE:

FROM :

SUBJECT:

On the first night when we showed the Coral Sea we had an attendance of approximately sixty. The remaining nights we had approximately thirty to forty. This clearly was because the reserve officers discovered that it wasn't necessary for them to go. In connection with this fact Admiral Holden said that he had noticed this; that he would be on a reserve selection board shortly and that those reserves who did not attend classes properly would find it difficult to be promoted. He didn't tell this to me, but to someone else, so I cannot credit it.

(e) Number of Civilians Attending: I heard a number of complaints from some discussion groups that they didn't have enough civilians. One group said they had only one civilian whereas others had more. I didn't look into this because I believed that it is true. Perhaps next year we can obtain more civilians.

(f) Type Civilians: In general everyone seemed to feel that we had had good discussions this year. However, I heard some wish that in the future we could get civilians of greater success in business. However, I heard this largely from members of the staff and I heard nothing from the civilians on it.

(g) Repeaters: As I said last year I am thoroughly sold on the idea of repeaters but I think efforts should be made to insure that the repeaters realize that they are here to help the newcomers. I thought there was tendency on the part of some of the repeaters this year to relax in this objective.

(h) Plenary Session: I think that in view of the fact that the PS remained on a global strategy level it was in general above most of the past sessions. However, I was very concerned that this discussions and questions posed, and the answers made were by civilians. We had Major George Fielding Elliott, Mr. Joseph C. Harsch, and Mr. Hanson Baldwin providing most of the discussion. I am not in opposition to having discussions by men of the caliber of these gentlemen, but I am opposed to having all discussions by civilians. Last year the presence of the Commander in Chief and his staff and the fact that the CinC spoke at length helped greatly.

(i) Navy League: The Navy League for the first time had an important part in these discussions. This was because Admiral Bergen is now head of the Navy League and is very anxious to boost the League. It was also because Admiral Burke called him a week ago--that is the week just prior to the GSD--and told him that he was very anxious for the Navy League to get behind the Coordinator Bill, and that with the Navy League behind it it might help. That is the reason Admiral Bergen stressed the Navy League

0119

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE:

FROM :

SUBJECT:

to a degree and I suppose the Coordinator Bill as well.

I am not critical of Admiral Bergen nor of the Navy League members here--there seemed to be about forty of them--because the directive from CNO was strong. I am merely saying that I thought that it temporarily took priority over the GSD or seemed to.

(j) Admiral Bergen: I think that Admiral Bergen contributed a good deal this year. He had his hands in everything. He seemed to know all of the civilians and has obtained such prestige in the financial and naval world, that is every one is happy to see him. I have seen times when there were a few "kicks" against him, but I have heard none this time.

Finally I think that our GSD was most successful. I think that the civilians have obtained a better picture of the Navy's position in global strategy and I feel that our officers have in return been provided with an excellent background of civilian concepts.

My final recommendation is, keep it up.

R. W. BATES

0120

Com. Bates

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND

18 July 1957

MEMO FOR ALL HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS

Subj: Missions and Tasks of Naval War College

1. You may remember that OpNav Instruction 1520.12 of 30 April 1957 (which was not cleared with the War College before issuance) contained the rather surprising statement that "the Naval War College is under the military control of the Commandant First Naval District". The Chief of Naval Operations is drawing up a revision of that instruction, deleting that item. The only other significant change contemplated is to specify that the Chief of Naval Personnel exercises management (instead of "administrative") control over the Naval War College.

2. The President and I have gone over this redraft, and are inclined to concur in it with the possible exception of adding in the next-to-last paragraph (which is entitled "Additional Programs") the final following sub-paragraph:

Completing strategical and tactical analyses of certain major operations of World War II.

3. Since this OpNav Instruction is really the War College's "charter", it is of immense importance to us. Accordingly, although the President and I are inclined to accept as indicated above, the possible comments of all Heads of Departments are invited before a final agreement is given. Please give this your attention right now, and give me (by phone will suffice) any suggested alterations -- or just let my secretary know that you agree as is (with or without the addition regarding the WWII Battle Evaluations).


C. H. LYMAN

0121

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : President, Naval War College

DATE: 13 AUG 1957

FROM : Commodore R. W. Bates, USN

SUBJECT:

1. The card which Admiral Hillenkoetter requested be sent to Mr. Cassidy in Chicago has been sent this afternoon to Mr. Cassidy's Chicago address via air mail.
2. This will, I hope, satisfy Admiral Hillenkoetter.
3. I am sorry about the delay in this because I had taken this up with both Mr. White and Miss Carney just before I left for the Coast. I had Admiral Hillenkoetter's letter in my basket for check upon my return here. Your query to me expedited my action.
4. The policy of the Club in this matter is to allow such guest cards to be given only to people who live outside the local area. One guest card of seven days is permitted per year so that in the case of Mr. Cassidy theoretically no extensions will be approved by the Club.
5. The reason I suggested that you not take action in this case was because honorary members, while they have the privileges of the club for themselves and their families, are not granted permission to issue guest cards.

R. W. BATES

0122

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : President, Naval War College
 Via : Chief of Staff *MS*

DATE: 13 AUG 1957

FROM : Head, World War II Battle Evaluation Group

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT:

1. While out on the Coast I had a long talk with Admiral Nimitz over the telephone. I wanted to see him personally as I do every year, but he had some foreign guests whom he was showing the area and that meant that he would not be home. I talked to the Admiral about several subjects, and he interposed several. The substance of the conversation, so far as I can recall, was as follows:

a. Captain Chester W. Nimitz, Jr.: I told the Admiral that when I arrived in Minneapolis the press had interrogated me ratherly strongly on my attitude toward the retirement of Admiral Nimitz's son, Captain Chester W. Nimitz., Jr. I told the Admiral that I had told the press that I was disappointed but that I couldn't be too critical as he had served his necessary duty under the law. I asked the Admiral if he could tell me why his son had decided to retire. The Admiral answered about as follows:

(1) He had nothing to do with the retirement of his son except to assist him to retire.

(2) That his son had made the decision on his own and had come to him for help as indicated above.

(3) He asked his son to give him his estimate of the situation, i.e., why was it that he wanted to retire. The son had replied that:

(a) There were too many Admirals in the Navy today. This was shown by the fact that many Admirals were employed in Captains' billets.

(b) That even though he made Admiral the future did not appeal to him because the chances were very good that he would find himself for a good part of the time employed in a Captain's billet.

(c) He felt that the Admiral's list had to be cut down, in which case there was no guarantee that, even if he made Admiral, he would be held on the list.

(d) He had three daughters; all of college age, and he desired to give them a suitable education.

(e) His present and prospective finances were poor. He apparently said nothing to Admiral Nimitz about the Cordiner Bill, but the Press said that Captain Nimitz claimed that if the Cordiner Bill had passed he would have been inclined to remain. If this is so then the statements about the Admirals in the Navy and the financial situation do not jibe.

0123

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: 13 AUG 1957

FROM :

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT:

b. Battle for Leyte Gulf: I asked the Admiral some questions about Leyte as that is the action which I am now, and have been working on for some years. The Admiral said that he could not remember much about it as thousands of dispatches crossed his desk and he was not in command of the Leyte operation. I told the Admiral that I had been interested greatly in the fact that many of the submarine commanders, in fact too many of them, failed to carry out their orders and persisted in wandering off station. I pointed out that the most notable of these were the three submarines off Bungo Suido, which had been ordered to prevent the undetected sortie of the Japanese fleet out of the Bungo, and had left the area without authority just before the fleet sortied, thus missing it. I also told him that the fliers, largely land-based, persisted in making searches which were incomplete and persisted in attacking ships when they were on reconnaissance. To this the Admiral replied. "Young men will never learn to listen to their elders' experience and advice", and he further stated that he had known about some of this, and knew that I was pointing it out without hesitation in my writings. To this I replied that that was correct, but that I was not limiting my comments in these matters to the fliers and submarine commanders, but was also pointing out that it was also the responsibility of the immediate superiors as well. In this connection I want to state what the Admiral told me last year. It was this: That "he expected me to criticize commanders' decisions without hesitation and that if I failed to do it I would not be the fellow that they thought I was when they gave me this assignment." I told him to have no concern on that score; that I had been doing this from the beginning and that to my great satisfaction all commanders who had been critized, have, in general, accepted the facts and have agreed with the comments.

c. Long-Range Missiles: The Admiral then announced that he thought that the Navy was not being too well handled in the matter of missiles. He stated that he believed that the Navy had wasted vast sums of money on long-range missiles as well as on other weapons when they should have restricted themselves to shorter range missiles such as could shoot down a plane. He talked for quite a while on this. It is possible that he had gotten some of these ideas from the Secretary of Defense, or vice versa, for he had been with the Secretary for the past week at the Bohemian Grove. In reply to this I told the Admiral that I felt that we had to explore the major fields and that this could not be done in a day. Therefore I was of the opinion that we had to have scientists working on something greater than short-range missiles.

UNCLASSIFIED

0124

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: 13 AUG 1957

FROM :

CLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT:

d. President, Naval War College: The Admiral wished to know who the new President of the Naval War College would be and I said Admiral Ingersoll. To this he queried, "Stuart Ingersoll?" I said yes. He then stated that he was very pleased about this selection. I told him we were too!

e. Education: We then went into a discussion about the necessity for education in command. I pointed out to him that in my studies I had discovered many poor decisions by officers who had a reputation for competence, and that these decisions were often made at most inopportune times. I told him further that in my opinion the necessity for brains in war was vital and that the time was not too far distant when we would not have the military power that we had against the Japs and that mistakes in command would be even less acceptable than they had been in World War II. To all of this he thoroughly agreed. Because of this and other factors he seems to be a great friend of the Naval War College.

f. Seats at the Stadium: The Admiral went on to say that he had been given the right to name some of the seats at the stadium. He said he would name one for Forest Sherman, one for Charles McMorris, the other I have forgotten, and he stated that if given more to name he will name one for McCormick.



R. W. BATES

CLASSIFIED

0125

STANDARD FORM NO. 64
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Office Memorandum

UNCLASSIFIED

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : President, Naval War College

DATE: 20 AUG 1957

FROM : Head, World War II Battle Evaluation Group

SUBJECT: Trip Report

1. I made a trip to Washington yesterday largely in connection with my office. However, I did talk with a number of officers during my short visit to BuPers.

a. Vice Admiral Holloway: I had a very friendly talk with Admiral Holloway lasting about fifteen minutes. I told him that you plan to come down shortly to visit him and to talk with him. I stated that you did not desire to talk to him about anything in particular, but just a sort of general exchange of views on matters of your own choosing. To this Admiral Holloway replied as follows: "Rafe, you tell Admiral Ingersoll that it is high time he got here. Jimmie seemed very pleased with this and kept repeating to me this same phrase, and later on in the afternoon when I encountered him on the staircase, he said, "Don't forget to emphasize my statement 'it is high time he got here'." All of this was in good humor!

After this Admiral Holloway talked about his plans for Admiral Robbins; about why he had cut out Warfare TWO; and about what certain of the new assignments would be, including himself. In this connection he said to me he "would appreciate it if you do not tell Admiral Ingersoll about what these assignments are because I want to tell him myself". I judge from this that he would like to see you shortly because information like this does not remain quiet.

Warfare TWO: I didn't discuss this with him--in fact he did most of the talking--but he endeavored to explain that he felt that Admiral Connolly had wished this two-year course on him and why it was he had cancelled it. I tried to explain what I knew about it and the reasons therefor, which reasons I thought he had not heard. However, the course has been cancelled and will go out of existence next year; therefore running about half of its planned length.

Admiral Holloway also said that he has a son-in-law here, a Commander Heyworth, in Warfare ONE.

b. Personnel Situation at Naval War College: I spoke to Mr. Kenyon (for the Secretary) about the personnel situation here as of 15 August. Mr. Kenyon read the memorandum from the Chief Clerk to the Secretary which I brought with me. He concurs that it would be advisable to fill all vacancies as soon as feasible. There is no known objection to elevating a GS-5 to a GS-7 War Games Specialist billet if such is considered desirable by Naval War College authorities. However, in the event of such a promotion it is suggested that the billet then left

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0126

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

UNCLASSIFIED

DATE:

20 AUG 1957

FROM :

SUBJECT:

vacant be filled at the earliest possible time. With respect to billets in which difficulty in recruiting is being experienced, it will be psychologically desirable to fill the billets in order to keep the on board count as near as possible to the overall ceiling. It was emphasized, however, that temporarily using billets such as the Electronics Engineer for other purposes will not result in the provision of additional billets at such time as it may be feasible to recruit an electronics engineer. I would judge from this, and from my talk with Mr. Kenyon, that they are very friendly to the War College and will do their very best to keep us afloat. It seems to me that if we carry out the above, we will be in pretty good shape.

c. Captain John Noel: Captain Noel, in personnel, came to me about establishing a new correspondence course in the Naval War College. I told him that it was outside my field but I would listen to what he had to say. He said that they have established a management course at the Post-Graduate School in Monterey and were anxious to establish a correspondence course on the same subject up here. I said that I could not speak for the President of the Naval War College but it seemed to me that if we were going to have a course in management that the course should flow out of Monterey in parallel with the management course there. He said that Monterey was not authorized to give correspondence courses and therefore it fell on this college. I stated that while I felt that there was a great deal in common between management and command that there were also wide divergencies largely in language and therefore I did not feel that the course should be here. However, it might be that the President of the Naval War College would view this with more favor than I did.

d. Commander Love: I encountered Commander Love, the Assistant for Women Officer Distribution, in the corridor and she told me that the Waves had sent up here a Lieutenant Commander Named Jane Potter who they hoped would be a student in the War College. I said I knew Miss Potter and at the present moment she was in the Intelligence Section awaiting a decision as to whether she would be a full student or not. Miss Love asked my attitude toward Miss Potter being a student. I said I was not familiar with the particulars of the case but that from what I knew I did not approve it. I pointed out that there is a rule of "need to know" that based on this rule I could not see why she should be here in the course at all. I further said that I had heard lecturers object to the females in the audience because, there are, on occasions, matters which they would not like to present in discussing someone or some phenomena which they preferred not to mention in the presence of females. Miss Love said that she thought that matters of that kind should be left out of the Naval War College curriculum. This interested me greatly because

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Miss Love knows nothing of the curriculum and in my mind should not take stands on matters unknown. Miss Love knows that I am very friendly with the Waves and knows that I realize that there are a lot of places where they fit in very well; therefore she knows that in my remarks I am not being at all unfriendly. I said that I understood that Rear Admiral Robbins, as President, had opposed this and that I had heard that other top officers, as well, had expressed some disapproval, but that I could not say what the present Chief of Staff and the President of the Naval War College were going to do about this. Outside of this we parted in a very friendly way, as I am extremely fond of Miss Love.

e. Rear Admiral Robbins: I encountered Admiral Robbins in Rear Admiral Hanlon's office. Admiral Robbins stated that he had no particular assignment, but temporarily, at least, appeared to be relieving Admiral Hanlon as head of retirement boards and matters of that nature. My guess is that Admiral Robbins isn't impressed with his prospective assignments.

f. Rear Admiral Hanlon: I had quite a talk with Admiral Hanlon about a lot of things, one in particular being about one of the tests he made as CTF 7. I will tell you about it. Admiral Hanlon is going to be a Vice Admiral.

One matter I discussed with him was my great disagreement with Admiral Oldendorf prior to our late afternoon entry into Lingayen Gulf on January 9th, 1945. I had tried, ineffectively, to convince the Admiral that he should not move in at such a late hour, but he insisted on going in and we were heavily hit. I wanted to be sure that what I remembered was correct and Admiral Hanlon, who was on board and in command of the UDT's, concurred in all particulars.

g. Commander Hindman: I noted on the selection list that Commander S. E. Hindman, who was in my section about four years ago, failed of selection to Captain. I therefore discussed this with Captain Matter in Bupers (this section was once Op-54).

The section broke out his record, and they said that to the best of their knowledge Commander Hindman was an outstanding officer and there was no reason that they could see why the board had failed to promote him. However, they pointed out that the number of officers selected was about fifty-eight percent. I pointed out that an outstanding officer is in the upper ten percent. I am going to write to Commander Hindman about this.

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h. Foreign Officers: I was asked here and there about the foreign officers and I said that it looked as though this class was going to be as successful as the last; that the number of officers arriving was about thirty. I stated that I had talked to some of them, in particular the Spaniard, the Frenchman and the Pakistani; that they all seemed very interested and anxious to get going. It seems to be well-known that the last class was highly successful and these new officers were loud in their praise about it. Because of this success, the Navy Department (Admiral Burke) has officers of foreign navies of ranks and backgrounds very similar to the officers ordered here to take courses, among other items, in mine warfare. I said that if this was true, it was my thought it might be well to send the officers reporting here for duty to these courses first and that this would make them much better able to absorb what we would give them and lessen our load here. They were quite interested in this and said that it could well be true. Exactly to whom I spoke, I don't know. I thought I knew but I was wrong. I have reported this matter to Captain Colbert and he is going to talk it up when he goes to Washington. He says that these classes are not only to include officers of the nations coming here, but are also to include officers from nations which are not desired here.

i. Captain Bertholf: I talked to Captain Bertholf about a cartographer. The World War II Battle Evaluation Group is now allowed a cartographer. We have not worried about it heretofore because we have had much success with the civilian draftsmen attached to the college. However, the new restrictions imposed on civil service may cause us to have difficulty obtaining competent draftsmen. It has been suggested that we make a request for a cartographer to BuPers. (Actually there is no rating of cartographer today. It is called Draftsman (Topographer). A request will be forwarded shortly.

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